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Abstract
This note considers a cash-in-advance (CIA) economy in which the
CIA constraint is applied not only to consumption but also to all or
a part of investment and the discounting rate is a function of con-
sumption. It investigates the eect of monetary growth on capital,
money, consumption, and welfare. It demonstrates that as long as
the condition assuring the uniqueness of steady state holds, the ef-
fect on the above variables is all-negative, although a positive slope
of the discounting function mitigates the negative eect. This result
can establish a qualitative equivalence among the money-in-the-utility
model, the transaction-costs model, and the CIA model.
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1 Introduction
As Wang and Yip (1992) and Chen et al. (2008) stated, the relationship
between ination and capital stock has been one of the central issues in
monetary macroeconomic theory. Modern macroeconomics includes many
approaches in terms of introducing money. Standard approaches are the
money-in-the-utility (MIU) approach, the cash-in-advance (CIA) approach,
and the transaction-cost (TC) approach. Money is demanded because money
makes consumers happy (MIU), because they cannot buy goods without
money (CIA), or because more money saves transaction costs, including time
(TC). Predicting the eect of anticipated ination on capital accumulation
generally depends on what approach is adopted.
Feenstra (1986) established a functional equivalence between the three
approaches. The CIA constraint on consumption only (Lucas, 1980) is a
special case of a utility function1 in the MIU approach or of a transaction
cost function2 in the TC approach. Feenstra demonstrated a duality between
the MIU and TC approaches, but required a monetary model without cap-
ital and labor decisions and a redenition of choice variables. The utility
function is also too special to be used in a usual economic analysis. With
such specication, Feenstra showed, money is superneutral in that monetary
expansion does not aect any real variable except real balance holdings.
1Specically, w(c;m) = min[c;m], where w is an instantaneous utility function of money
m and consumption c, and m and c are perfect complements.
2Specically, T (c;m) = T0I(0 < c  m), where T represents the transaction-cost
function, I is an indicator function and T0 is a suciently large constant.
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Wang and Yip (1992) established a qualitative equivalence; they discov-
ered conditions in which all three approaches predict the same comparative
static results in sign. They considered a monetary model with endogenous
capital and labor decisions. Especially, in the CIA approach, they considered
the generalized CIA constraints (Stockman, 1980), in which the constraint is
applied not only to consumption but also to all or part of investments. When
the real balance eect of money growth is weakly dominated by the consump-
tion eect and some conditions3 are satised, higher monetary growth lowers
steady state capital, labor, real balances, consumption, and welfare.
Chen et al. (2008) shed new light on the qualitative equivalence between
the MIU and TC approaches using an endogenous time preference. Even
when labor supply is inelastic, they showed a long-run negative (resp. posi-
tive) relationship between ination and capital when the degree of impatience
is decreasing (resp. increasing) in money in the MIU approach and in con-
sumption in the TC approach. However, unlike Wang and Yip (1992), they
did not explore the CIA approach. To complete their qualitative equivalence,
this note examines the eect of monetary growth on capital using the CIA
model with endogenous time preference.
This note is not the rst to employ the CIA model with endogenous time
preference. Hayakawa (1995) investigated the relationship between ination
and capital when consumption and money are perfect complements in the
3The conditions are Pareto complementarity between consumption and money, Pareto
complementarity between consumption and leisure, and Pareto substitutability between
money and leisure.
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MIU approaches. He found that money is strong superneutral,4 independent
of the nature of time preference. His functional specication is essentially
the same as the model with the CIA constraint only on consumption.5 Nev-
ertheless, he did not examine the case of generalized CIA constraints. As
Stockman (1985) showed, when the CIA constraint applies to both consump-
tion and investment, higher growth rates of money supply lower capital stock
in the case of constant time preference. Whether this property holds even
in the case of endogenous time preference must be an interesting research
question.
In the following, this note employs a CIA economy in which not only is
consumption constrained but so is part or all of investment and the discount-
ing rate is a function of consumption. We examine the eect of monetary
expansion on capital, money, consumption, and welfare and demonstrate that
as long as a condition assuring the uniqueness of steady state holds, the ef-
fect on all these variable is negative. The sign of the eect is independent of
whether the discounting rate is increasing in consumption or not, which is
dierent from the results of the MIU and TC models in Chen et al. (2008).
Furthermore, adding the comparative statics results to those in Chen et
al. (2008), we establish a qualitative equivalence among the three approaches.
Higher ination lowers steady state capital, money, consumption, and welfare
4Hayakawa (1995) uses the term superneutral when monetary expansion does not aect
any real variable except real balance holdings, and strong superneutral when it also aects
real balances.
5To be exact, the CIA constraint should be binding.
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when the degree of impatience is decreasing in money in the MIU approach
and in consumption in the TC approach and when money is required not
only to for consumption purchases but also for part or all of investment in
the CIA approach.
2 Model and Results
This section describes our model economy, provides the monetary equilibrium
and the steady state, discusses the uniqueness of that steady state, and nally
conducts comparative statics.
Consider a monetary economy, in which ct, mt, and kt respectively de-
notes consumption, real money balance, and capital at period t. Technology
is characterized by an increasing, concave function f(kt) with f(0) = 0. Rep-
resentative agents are innitely long-lived with perfect foresight and complete
access to the capital market. Their preference is characterized by a felicity
function u(ct) and a discounting function (ct). We assume u is increasing
and strictly concave and  is positive and concave.
The homogeneous economic agents face two constraints. The rst is the
budget constraint:
_kt + _mt = f(kt) + vt   ct   tmt (1)
where vt is the lump-sum transfer, and the t is the rate of ination.
6 The
6For a price level Pt at period t, the rate of ination is determined by t = _Pt=Pt.
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second is the budget constraint7:
ct +  _kt  mt (2)
for 0     1. The cash-in-advance constraint with   = 0 applies only to
the purchase of consumption, whereas the constraint with   = 1 indicates
that money is also needed for investment. The former and the latter are
respectively continuous versions of Lucas (1980) and Stockman (1981). The
parameter   represents the degree of credit tightness.
Agents initially have capital stock k0 > 0 and money stock M0 > 0.
8
They have the following lifetime-utility:
Z 1
0
u(ct) expf tgdt; (3)
where t, determined by _t = (ct), represents the cumulative discounting
rate. The discounting rate  represents the degree of impatience and is a
function of consumption.9 When c > 0 (resp. c < 0), the agents become
more (resp. less) impatience as they consume more. When c = 0, the degree
of impatience is constant.
7Another type of constraint is proposed by Palivos et al. (1993). Their continuous
version is
c+  (; )k  m:
In their model,   is a function of the ination rate  and a measure of credit looseness .
8For any initial price level P0, real balances m0 = M0=P0. Real balances mt at period
t > 0 are choice variables.
9See Chen et al. (2008) for justifying the consideration of endogenous time preference
into a monetary model.
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The representative agent chooses ct and mt to maximize (3) subject to
the budget and cash-in-advance constraints (1) and (2), the initial conditions
k0 > 0 and M0 > 0, and the transversality conditions. The necessary and
sucient conditions for optimization are discussed in the appendix.
The government behaves in a (monetary-theoretically) conventional way.
It prints money at a constant rate  and runs a balanced budget by transfer-
ring seigniorage revenues to the consumers in a lump-sum faishon: vt = mt.
At equilibrium, the money and the goods markets are clear:
_mt = (  t)mt (4)
_kt = f(kt)  ct: (5)
A monetary equilibrium is a set of the path fct; kt;mt; t; t; t; t; tg1t=0
that maximizes (3) subject to (1) and (2) as welll as the initial conditions,
and where the government behavior condition and the market equilibrium
conditions hold. Note that t, t, and t are the shadow prices of money,
capital, and the CIA constraints, respectively, and t represents the indirect
lifetime utlity or welfare from the period of t. These variables are dened in
the appendix.
At steady state, _c = _m = _k = _ = _ = _ = _ = 0. The steady state
conditions (denoted by asterisks) are  = , c = m = f(k),
uc(c
)  c(c) =  +  (6)
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= = 1 +  = (7)
= = + (c) (8)
fk(k
) = (c)= (9)
 = u(c)=(c):
Combining c = f(k); (7), (8), and (9) leads to:
fk(k
) = (f(k)) +  (f(k))f+ (f(k))g: (10)
It is evident that there exists a unique k > 0 when + (f(k)) > 010 for
all k > 0,
fkk < cfkf1 +  (+ 2)g (11)
for all k, limk!0 fk = 1, and limk!1 fk = 0. For  > 0,  > 0, and
 > 0, we should additionally assume uc   cu= > 0 for all c > 0. The
additional assumption as well as (11) are assured by the condition that c  0
for all c > 0. When   = 0, in which the cash-in-advance constraint applies
only to consumption, then (11) simplies to fkk < cfk. This is exactly the
Correspondence Principle (CP), discussed in Chen et al. (2008).11
Next, we conduct comparative statics.12 First, we examine the eect of
10It follows from (8) that = > 0.
11Chen et al. proved the uniqueness only in the case where the discount rate is inde-
pendent of real balances in the MIU model. The uniqueness in other cases is just shown
graphically without rigorous proof.
12The comparative statics are evaluated at the steady state, and asterisks are omitted
to ease the burden of notation.
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rates of money supply  on capital k at the steady state. It follows from (10)
that
dk
d
=
 
fkk   cfkf1 +  (+ 2)g : (12)
at steady state. When   = 0, then dk=d = 0. That is, money is superneu-
tral, which is consistent with Hayakawa (1995). In the case of   > 0, when
we assume (11), then dk=d < 0. That is, money is not neutral.
Then, we investigate the eect of  on other variables: consumption c,
real balances m, and indirect lifetime-utility . Since c = m = f(k) at the
steady state, dc=d = dm=d = fkdk=d. Since  = u= at the steady state,
d
d
=
d
dc
dc
d
=
u

 
uc
u
  c

!
dc
d
= ( + )
fk

dk
d
:
From (6),  +  > 0 when uc   cu= > 0 at the steady state. Thus, as long
as  +  > 0 and   > 0, the ination eect on consumption, real balance,
and welfare is negative, independent of the sign of c.
3 Discussion
This section discusses the comparative statics results. First, we explain the
mechanism of the comparative statics and discuss the role of the discounting
rate function. Then, comparing our results to past literature, we establish a
qualitative equivalence. Finally, we suggest a future task to further this line
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of research.
The mechanism of the comparative statics (12) is as follows. From (8),
increasing the growth rate of money raises the shadow price ratio of cash-in-
advance constraints to money =. From (7), increasing = aects the
shadow price ratio of capital to money = when   > 0. Since fk decreases
with k and c = f(k), equation (9) indicates that increasing = has a
negative eect on the steady state of capital. As long as the cash-in-advance
constraint applies only to consumption, (7) says that the shadow price ratio
of capital to money is unaltered, indicating that capital is costlessly obtained
by barter (Stockman, 1981). But when   > 0, higher ination makes capital
more expensive than real balances, and induces decreases in capital stock.
The constraint on part or all of investment operates as taxes on capital goods.
Whether  is increasing or decreasing in c, a Tobin eect, a positive
relationship between ination and capital stock, never emerges as long as
the CP condition (11) hold. When c > 0, however, the eect of ination
on capital stock is mitigated. When   > 0, holding capital is relatively
expensive, and ination lowers the level of consumption as well as capital.
Lower consumption makes an economic agent with c > 0 more patient,
moderating a decrease in capital stock. On the other hand, since people with
c < 0 tend to be more impatient and save less, higher ination accelerates
a decrease in capital stock.
As discussed in the introduction, Wang and Yip (1992) established a
qualitative equivalence among the TC, CIA, and MIU approaches using a
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monetary model with an elastic labor supply and constant time preference.
On the other hand, Chen et al. (2008) showed an equivalence between the TC
and MIU approaches using a model with inelastic labor decisions and endoge-
nous time preference. A reverse Tobin eect emerges when the discounting
rate is decreasing in real balances in the MIU model and in consumption in
the TC model. Such a decreasing discounting rate is supported by empir-
ical results.13 With the results in the previous section, we can establish a
qualitative equivalence among the TC, CIA, and MIU models with inelas-
tic labor decisions and endogenous time preference. Higher ination lowers
steady state capital, money, consumption, and welfare in the long run when
the degree of impatience is decreasing in money in the MIU approach and in
consumption in the TC approach and when money is required not only to
for consumption purchases but also for part or all of investment in the CIA
approach.
As shown in Chen et al. (2008), a Tobin eect emerges when the dis-
counting rate is increasing in consumption and money in the TC and MIU
models. In our model, the positive slope of the discounting rate function
only appeases the severity of the negative relationship between ination and
capital, and cannot generate a Tobin eect. That is, the CIA constraint's
eect reducing capital stocks dominates the impatience eect increasing cap-
ital stocks. Similarly, if a labor decision were introduced in the TC and MIU
models, the endogenous labor eect might be dominant over the impatience
13See Chen et al. (2008) for empirical literature regarding endogenous time preference.
11
eect, independent of the slope of the discounting rate. Therefore, exploring
a qualitative equivalence among the three monetary models with endogenous
labor decisions and endogenous time preference would be, although compli-
cated, an intriguing future task.
Appendix
This appendix provides the necessary and sucient conditions for optimiza-
tion in which the economic agent maximizes (3) subject to (1) and (2) and
the initial and transversality conditions.
We denote investment by x = _k.14 The present value Hamiltonian is
H = exp( )[u(c)+ (f(k)+ v  c m x)+ x+(m  c  x) (c)];
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the cash-in-advance constraints, and
,  and  are the costate variables for _m, _k, and _; respectively. As shown
in the next paragraph,  is negative when u < 0.
The rst order-conditions yield:
uc   c =  + 
 =  +  
_ = (+ )   
14Capital depreciation is assumed to be zero in order to compare our results with those
of Wang and Yip (1992) and Chen et al. (2008). Introducing capital depreciation still
produces the same comparative statics results.
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_ =    fk
_ =  u+ ; (13)
and the initial conditions and the transversality conditions: limt!1 tmt expf tg =
0, limt!1 tkt expf tg = 0 and limt!1tt expf tg = 0. Notice that
the last dierential equation (13) with the last transversality conditon has
(3) as a solution, leading to  < 0 when u < 0.
For a sucient condition for the maximization problem, we should assume
the Hamiltonian H is concave with respect to c, m, k, a, and  for any
~  0, ~  0, ~  0, and ~  0, where ~ = exp( ), ~ = exp( ),
~ = exp( ), and ~ = exp( ). A sucient condition for concavity
is that e u(c) is concave. Such concavity holds if u < 0, ucc < 0, and
uucc   u2c > 0 for all c, excluding the possibility that u > 0. We assume the
felicity function satises these conditions.15
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